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In this article we use actual instances of human conduct with animals to reflect on the debates about ani-
mal agency in human activities. Where much of psychology, philosophy, and sociology begin with a
fundamental scepticism over animal mind as the grounds for its inquiries, we join with a growing body
of work that examines the continuities between animals and humans, and accepts the positive possibili-
ties of anthropomorphising animals. We are interested in the reason and intelligence that animals dis-
play in their activities with humans. Inverting the typical approach of explaining canine reason by ref-
erence to the behaviour of their wild counterparts, we describe human–canine action as it occurs in the
widespread, historically assembled, and spatially situated activity of dog walking in parks. We treat
dog walking as a living accomplishment of owner and dog methodically displaying intent and produc-
ing social objects.
THE PLACES OF HUMAN–ANIMAL MIND
Philosophers, ethologists, neuroscientists, builders of robots, animal rights groups, and others have
fiercely debated the relations between animal mind and human mind (Bekoff & Jamieson, 1990;
Griffin, 1992; Midgely, 1983; Nagel, 1986). A persistent impulse in these debates has been the de-
limitation of what an animal is and what a human is, or if you like, the boundary between animal be-
ing and human being. Related scientific investigations of canine mind and human–canine psychol-
ogy (Bergler, 1988) have proceeded mostly from the premise that dogs are quite naturally different
from humans. Although we do not deny the difference between dogs and humans, we are wary of
the next move that is made by many ethologists, psychologists, zoologists, and neuroscientists to
sunder dogs from their place beside us as fellow subjects. In her reading of Charles Darwin’s The
Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals, Crist (1999, 2002) recovered a positive and bold an-
thropomorphism as a constitutive stance in Darwin’s studies of animals and insects. For Darwin
there was an “evolutionary continuity” (Crist, 1999, p. 49) between all animals that in turn un-
avoidably included mental and behavioural continuities, and this came with the further implication
MIND, CULTURE, AND ACTIVITY, 13(1), 2–24
Copyright © 2006, Regents of the University of California on behalf of the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition
Correspondence should be sent to Eric Laurier, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Geography, Drummond Street, Ed-
inburgh, EH8 9XP. E-mail: eric.laurier@ed.ac.uk
that there was no “sceptical disjunction between observable body and un-observable mind” (Crist,
1999, p. 50).
As her examination of the use of language in portraying animal behaviour continued, Crist
pointed toward the growing mechano-morphism and scepticism of 20th-century ethologists such
as Lorenz and Tinbergen, and sociobiologists such as E. O. Wilson. Crist alerted readers to the se-
lective abandonment of Darwin’s language of continuity and his close analysis of anecdotal evi-
dence. In the interests of the later sciences of animal behaviour, generic and “frequency laden”
(Crist, 1999, pp. 143–149) observations of animals’ activities were prioritised to provide quantita-
tive measures. Descriptions of episodes of animal interactions, where they were still included as
evidence, were disengaged from local historical particulars and generalised. Animal skills, ac-
complishments, calculations, and characters were subordinated as illustrations of underlying in-
nate release mechanisms or, as Crist (1999) elegantly expressed it, the “calculus of genes” (p.
126). In sympathy with Crist’s reading of Darwin and a growing body of antisceptical treatments
of animal mind (Arluke & Sanders, 1996; Cox & Ashford, 1998; Gaita, 2003; Goode, forthcom-
ing; Shapiro, 1990), our ambition in this article is to return to Darwin’s “powerful view of animal
life as experientially meaningful, authored, and temporally cohesive” by way of a language of a
shared lifeworld. Our approach to animal mind touches on critiques from various quarters in psy-
chology (Hutchins, 1995) and ethology (Bekoff & Jamieson, 1990) that human and animal cogni-
tion have been removed from the local settings in which they are embedded. Once cognition is
formalised in laboratory configurations and statistical methodologies, it becomes desocialised
and decultured, losing the ecology of tasks that provide both resources and problems for humans
and animals. Consequently we suggest that laboratory-based studies of canine cognition have in-
volved “taking the dog out of the park.”
Observations of the reasoning, intellectual abilities, and emotional life of dogs in experimental
settings have been carried out on the basis that each individual dog has a mind. Mind, in this view,
is possessed by individuals and is an indirectly accessible interior place whose physiological
home is the brain wherein its reason, intelligence, and personality reside. Mind, then, is taken to be
in some way a play of inner representations (symbols, mental images, pictures, etc.) looked upon
by a canino-monculi (the dog equivalent of homunculus). If one holds that a dog’s mind is inside
its head, then whether the dog’s body is in a laboratory or assisting a rescue team is merely inci-
dental. Yet if we follow Wittgenstein’s (1953) critique of “the inner” and “the outer” as it was
taken up by ethnomethodologists (Coulter, 1983) and others (Baker & Hacker, 1984), then as
Ryle (1949) put it
The statement the “mind is its own place,” as theorists might construe it, is not true, for the mind is not
even a metaphorical “place.” On the contrary, the chessboard, the platform, the scholar’s desk, the
judge’s bench, the lorry-driver’s seat, the studio and the football field are among its places. These are
where people work and play stupidly or intelligently. “Mind” is not the name of another person, work-
ing or frolicking behind an impenetrable screen; it is not the name of another place where work is done
or games are played; and it is not the name of another tool with which is work done, or another appli-
ance with which games are played. (p. 16)
In this article we look at the occasioned character of a park’s features (Zimmerman & Pollner,
1970) where the joint conduct of animals and humans actually and naturally occurs as a lived ac-
tivity, in contrast to the scientific studies of animal cognition as constructed via experiments (of-
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ten in the highly artificial environment of the laboratory). If we are suggesting that “animal minds
are wild minds, shaped by a history of environmental pressures”(Hauser, 2001, p. xvi), then these
minds will not be found by looking “inside their heads” but instead by studying animals’ practical
skills in the “wildness” of where ever it is that they inhabit. To read Hauser (2001) somewhat
against his own intentions, we would extend the “wild world” to include human culture in its rich
heterogeneity.
The term animal is itself too vague, whereas cat or dog or bat and especially the presence or ab-
sence of the qualifier pet provide different kinds of expectations of animals and of the different
things we do jointly with these animals. We have historically secured sociologics guiding our re-
lations with dogs that we constantly draw on and use. With dogs these are still more finely cate-
gorised by, for instance, breed of dog, such that certain breeds are known to be “good with
children,” “vicious,” “swimmers,” “energetic,” “easy to train,” “mostly for show,” “nervous,”
whereas others are not or are at some point in between on a scale (see Goode’s remarks on Katie’s
character arising from being a Corgi). All of this resides in our stock of everyday knowledge with-
out us ever even having a living relationship with an actual dog.
Goode made a striking start on the analysis of dog–human forms of life in his autoethnographic
study of playing stick and ball games with his dog (“Katie”). In this remarkable book, he pursued
“an adequately detailed account of the lived order of playing with a particular dog at a particular
time and place” (Goode). Drawing on ethnographic notes, daily observations, and video record-
ings, he presented a “punctilious” account of play with his dog to help the reader see the content of
play with a dog (what play with a dog actually consists of) in its living detail. As a player of dog
games, he provided a “production account” of the variations of fetching and getting the ball past
Katie. There are a number of “motifs” or recognisable structures to the play, not just getting the
ball past but also “pursuit and capture” that entailed Katie catching the ball with Goode playing
free-kicker and Katie being “goalie.” Alongside close descriptions of how each of these variants is
accomplished by dog and human, Goode showed how Katie or he initiated switches between the
variants. Rather than concentrating on what animals cannot do, he was constantly attentive to
what it is possible for humans and dogs to do and how it is possible:
All these motifs are mutually doable actions in which man-dog players of ball games could engage
given their asymmetrical bodily and conceptual possibilities. At the same time these possible mutual
doings are what creates the players and the games. That is, it is in their doing that players and games are
constituted, rather than the reverse. Thus, it would be an unimaginable game to play the free kick style
of play with [Katie] trying to get the ball by me. The shear physical insensibility of it precludes it as a
possible game for dog-man players. (Goode)
Goode also provided useful critiques of several other ethnographic approaches to studying
dogs. He was wary of researchers who gather talk about dogs from interviews and other sources
and treat these discourses as adequate accounts of conduct with dogs. At the very least such stud-
ies are ethnographically inadequate because they are premised on the notion that what people do
with dogs can be fully established from what people say about what they do. Equally Goode
critiqued symbolic-interactionist approaches such as those of Arluke and Sander (1996). These
approaches treat objects as shared symbols (e.g., a playing with a stick becomes symbolic redefi-
nition of an object), thereby distorting the object’s constitution in the “thick” of the play between
owner and dog. Although he applauded the willingness of such researchers to treat animals as “far
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more than a biological piece of machinery,” Goode spelled out with force how dogs should not be
defined as “virtual persons” nor, even worse, should they be equated with “linguistically disabled
humans” as symbolic interactionists frequently do. He drew on his earlier research (Goode, 1994)
with a child born deaf, blind, and quadriplegic to make it clear how different the two are:
While a formal feature of relationships with dogs and with persons who have no language is that the
language-using human is in the position to speak on behalf of the dog or the disabled person, comparing
these two types of lived orderliness as lived everyday realities reveals massive observable differences
between the two. (Goode)
Finally Goode, though impressed by Shapiro’s (1990) Schutzian-style reflections on everyday
conduct with his dog Sabaka, found himself dissatisfied with Shapiro’s account because of its
“generality” and its pursuit of the “other’s subjective experience of reality as the object of analy-
sis.”. As Goode went on to argue, in response to the critique of his earlier work by Lynch (1997),
being able to access the “inner” experience of the other is not a requirement of being able to coor-
dinate interaction with them. Moreover, those who have followed Sacks’ (1992a, 1992b) studies
of conversation and mind suspend the notion that individuals understand one another. Rather,
there is demonstrable evidence that individuals have procedural competence in conducting joint
actions (e.g., being able to take and offer turns in conversation, select next speakers, respond to
greetings with greetings, etc.). Our article shares with Goode’s comprehensive study of hu-
man–animal play a commitment to examining actual instances of joint conduct and the research
policies of ethnomethodology (Garfinkel & Wieder, 1992). However, whereas Goode described
his instances to respecify theories of play, we have a more traditional ethnomethodological (and
conversation analytic) concern with mind (Coulter, 1979; R. Watson, 1994) and draw on in-
stances of walking together.
TAKING THE DATA OUT OF THE PARK
The short study that we present in this article was limited in the access we had to dogs in the city.
We observed and recorded dogs only in parks, not dogs inside houses (Haraway, 2003), dogs at
work with police, dogs in veterinary surgeries (Roberts, in press), nor dogs herding sheep (Cox &
Ashford, 1998). Our data was limited to the lives of the dogs we saw in the park and did not include
their lives beyond the park. In short, the study was not intended to be an exhaustive collection of the
various communities of which dogs are members. We spent 2 days shooting video in two city cen-
tre parks in Gothenberg, Sweden. Our approach to shooting was observational and nonintrusive,
echoing the style of wildlife films (Burt, 2002; Crowson, 1979). It is also a style familiar to social
psychologist and sociologists in its desire to record naturally organised and naturally occurring ac-
tivities. We chose such a style because we wished to look at dog walking without disrupting or in-
terrupting: to “stalk” the dog walkers as one might normally stalk deer or some other “wild” animal
(Lorimer, 2004). In this sense our methodology was nonexperimental. We did this to gather ob-
served instances of quite ordinary dog walking in parks. In our use of naturally we are not trying to
suggest objective, naturalistic, or existing without human influence, will, or work. Rather, it is a
sense of the term that arises out of conversation analysis (CA) and ethno-inquires
(ethnomethodology):
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“naturally” has to do with spontaneity, fluency, and an apparent lack of guile, calculative design and re-
flective deliberation. The contrast between “naturally” produced activity and rational deliberation is
akin to the distinction between natural language and artificial (logical) language in 20th-century phi-
losophy of language. … Another relevant use of “natural” was Alfred Schutz’s (1962) “natural atti-
tude”: a pervasive pre-reflective orientation that characterizes living-in-the-world. To speak of a pre-
reflective “attitude” is not to mark a deficiency of insight or intelligence, but rather to speak broadly of
a rarely interrupted condition of worldly engagement. (Lynch, 2002, p. 533)
Our method of describing dog walking then involved ways of having it occur without our inter-
rupting it. In a methodological sense, various interruptions include, for instance, stopping the
walkers to interrogate them with a questionnaire or structured interview to ask them what they
were up to or how they were doing it.1 In his use of a video camera to record ball play with his
Corgi, Goode worried that he had ruined the game. Because he was both the sole camera operator
and one of the central players, the process of setting up the equipment to record each game of ball
left “Katie in a prolonged anticipation, dropping the ball repeatedly at my feet while I fumbled
with the apparatus. Thus, the quality of play is seriously compromised for her from the outset”
(Goode). To reiterate, our desire was not to gain objective and unbiased “data” as if we were not
present and did not come to the research with various commitments, specifically toward animals
as social subjects (McHugh, Raffel, Foss, & Blum, 1974). Our methodology, although observa-
tional and rooted in the close inspection of video recordings, was undoubtedly also participatory
in the sense that we had insiders’ knowledge of dogs and dog walking.
Approximately 30 instances of dog walking were recorded with a mini digital video cam-
corder. We reviewed these as a group using Adobe Premiere on an Apple Macintosh G4, and the
clips replayed repeatedly and in some cases in slow motion. Twelve clips were selected for further
review on the basis of the quality of their footage, their representativeness of aspects of the walk in
the park, and their contrast with one another (e.g., numbers of dogs being walked, numbers of in-
dividuals with dog, size of dog, etc.). We then viewed these clips several times employing meth-
ods for video analysis developed from CA approaches (Heath, 1997; Heath & Hindmarsh, 2002;
J. R. E. Lee & Watson, 1993; Lomax, 1998) and discussed what we could see in setting-relevant
terms. On the basis of these close inspections of the video, we wrote a shared description that
forms the first part of the results in the next section. The analysis and explication of this descrip-
tion forms the second part. The initial version of this article contained 12 instances and was conse-
quently very lengthy. Subsequently we edited the material down to five clips that deal with some
key features of the walk: the use of the path, mutual awareness, play, the use of the lead, and prac-
tices of passing by and bypassing other walkers and exiting the park. Our concentrated analysis of
a few instances was justified not only in terms of practicality. Gaita (2003) wrote in response to
Eugene Linden and Jeffrey Masson’s exhaustive batteries of anecdotes about animals wild and
domestic:
What is one supposed to with hundreds of uncorroborated accounts that animals can do this or that ex-
traordinary thing—count, talk, grieve, show remorse? Either one shrugs one’s shoulders or one wants
more careful description and more systematic and controlled observation, always with an eye on the
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1
Such accounts were of interest, and we discussed experiences of dog walking, dog-training courses, and so on. We also
read a collection of popular dog-training manuals and histories of dogs’ involvement in human activity (Lemish, 1996;
Philo & Wilbert, 2000).
conceptual questions involved in the description and in the accounts of what more careful, controlled
observation might show. One wants in other words, science in friendship with a scientifically sophisti-
cated philosophy and that is exactly what Linden and Masson seek to escape. Or, more accurately, they
do not understand the philosophical pressure to scepticism about consciousness. (p. 108)
Not only did we not wish to fall foul of using mere quantity of observations rather than careful
descriptions to convince our readers, but we also did not want to use endless facts as a way of set-
tling a conceptual argument. As Gaita (2003) noted, it is not a factual question whether parrots can
talk: “Many of our perplexities about animals are not a function of our uncertainty about the evi-
dence, but of our uncertainty about how to describe the evidence and how it bears on our willing-
ness to apply key concepts” (p. 111). Whereas Gaita relied on well-told biographical stories to
show how to apply concepts, we relied on the use of recorded single instances of dog walking.
This is a way of analysing empirical material that has been a constituent and reasoned part of eth-
no-inquiries from their outset. Before closely analysing a long transcript of a conversation, E. A.
Schegloff (1987) wrote
An analytic machinery which is meant to come to terms with the orderliness of interaction, and espe-
cially the orderliness of conduct in interaction, and to do so by explicating the orderly practices of the
participants in interaction (conversation or otherwise), should be able to deal in an illuminating manner
with single episodes of talk [or other forms of join conduct] taken from “the real world.” There is a con-
stitutive order to singular occasions of interaction, and to the organization of action within them. (p.
102)
Or to paraphrase Sacks (1992), if there is ordering going on everywhere, then wherever you
start you will find a piece of that ordering to begin your analysis. With that in mind we visited two
parks nearby with our camcorder.
DESCRIPTIONS AND ANALYSIS OF DOG WALKING
In this first, hopefully quite ordinary episode of observing events in the park, the dog and owner
maintained visual contact to coordinate their walking together (see Figure 1). They watched one
another’s progression along the path, seeing meanderings, pauses, and so on. Although the owner’s
look was harder to fathom, the dog’s over-the-shoulder look was easy to spot (Frame 6) because it
involved an obvious stopping and then turning of its anterior (Frame 6). Not only did the dog and
owner maintain awareness of one another’s positions in the park, but the dog also visibly checked
on its owner, and thus one another’s actions were glance-available (Sudnow, 1972).
For the walker (be it the dog or the man) in the rear position, checking on the location of the
front walker could be done quickly and regularly. (They probably remained constantly in the field
of vision.) Though checking position could be done regularly with the owner controlling from the
rear, “where are we walking to” appears to have been more of a problem if we assume the owner
was selecting which path to take. How might the owner have shown his selection? The dog and the
man were walking together but at different paces, meaning that the walker in the front position
was findable by the other walker. Given the Dalmatian’s yo-yoing, the dog was most often in this
front position, though sometimes the owner was. Being in first position is not the same as being in
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charge of where the walking group is going, of course. If we do not want to take the dog’s subordi-
nate position entirely for granted and we wish to explicate just how walking “directedly” is done,
then we can see here it was not through an owner issuing directions (or commands) to his dog. In-
deed, it is striking how little the owner did in relation to the dog beyond merely continuing to walk
steadily along the path. This is what the dog saw in Frame 6 as it neared the junction. As we noted
earlier, the owner could see the dog seeing him and this provided for the visibility of its query as a
form of “are we still going the same way,” whereas in other observations of the dog looking, the
owner would call out to wait, gesture, or depart from the path into the grass.
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FIGURE 1 Staying on the path. An elderly man strolled toward us, passed by,
and then walked off out of the park with his Dalmatian. Until they approached
the exit, the dog was off the leash. The owner kept the leash in his hands, which
were held together behind his back. The Dalmatian was free to run around off
the path. Looking several times at the owner, who kept a steady pace in the mid-
dle of the path throughout, the Dalmatian looked several places. The first look
while peeing (in Frame 2) involved a glance at the man, followed by a glance at
Ramia (RM), with a final glance back at the man before the dog moved off to re-
turn to the path. These three looks were done from the security and camouflage
of a bush. The dog returned to the path with RM in its sightlines (Frame 3),
passed RM (Frame 4), and walked on toward a junction of paths (Frame 5). The
man nodded a greeting to RM as he walked up to her. Shortly before the junc-
tion, the dog looked back over its shoulder toward the man (Frame 6). The
owner had a steady, slow walk, whereas the Dalmatian yo-yoed (a common
move for dogs off the leash): going ahead, stopping to mark territory, falling
back, catching-up, overtaking, and then falling back again.
In fact, it was so blindingly obvious that the path was being used by both walkers in coordinat-
ing the walk that we did not see it. Paths are, after all, a ubiquitous spatial feature of mobile life
forms recognisable to a multitude of actors beyond the human (Lorimer, 2004). Predators can use
paths to follow and find their prey. Migratory herds constantly reuse old paths to find their way
across landscapes. Primitive robots blindly follow paths laid down for them around storerooms.
As both the ethnographers and the dog could see, the owner never strayed from the path. He
walked slowly down the middle, breaking stride only once to look back at his dog when he passed
it while it was stopping to relieve itself. The dog was not so much yo-yoing away from the owner
as veering off to sniff or add its contribution at well-scented dog landmarks, then returning to the
path ahead of the owner. The path was an “oriented-object” (Garfinkel, 2002) for the dog and
owner that extended ahead of them, projecting a direction for the walk. By his ongoing self-posi-
tioning in the middle road, the owner selected this as their path, which had only, for the time being,
a single way ahead. The dog’s look was analysable by its relation to the next adjacent feature—the
crossroads. The dog’s query, although not formulated in words, could be found to be such a ques-
tion in the “sequence of events and actions that constitute one cohesive episode” (Crist, 1999, p.
205).
Finally, we can speculate briefly here on the routine nature for owners and dogs walking
through this park, along this particular path. The owner arrived here at mid-morning along with a
number of other walkers. Used routinely by dogs and owners, this city centre park forms a shared
historical territory for both: the paths, traversed daily and known for their length, their junctions,
lampposts, views, scenting opportunities, and so on.
The first thing the clip in Figure 2 shows is that there is a pace to walking together, which in this
case was fairly rapid, and that its rapidity was perhaps in some way set by the dogs, which, for the
first stretch of the walk, were constantly pulling ahead. The pace for its continuation relied also on
the owner’s acceptance of it by her not reigning in the dogs. It is striking on the video how she held
her arms at right angles with the leads, very much like horses’ reigns. At the time of the observa-
tion, we wondered whether she was a professional dog walker. This assumption stemmed from
this unusual manipulation of the leads in tandem with her walking with two dogs (where one dog
was an observable norm). From our own experiences of dog walking, we were aware that stepping
up the pace of the walk encourages the dog to walk ahead and not to sniff around or stop to relieve
itself. A second thing the clip shows is that dogs walk in different ways and that coordinating this
particular unit of three close walkers, one on two legs, and two on fours legs, was a challenging
task for all concerned, especially with two leashes involved that could get tangled in knots. Each
dog, as even this brief clip clearly shows, had its own character, the black dog more puppy-like
and playing with the leaves, the golden retriever snuffling around and moving more slowly. It re-
minded us at the time that dogs learn with age how to walk on a leash past lampposts without go-
ing to the side opposite from their walker and getting snagged.
Once again, the central point of analysis here is that the owner and the two dogs were engaged
in walking together in this particular park with its crisscross of paths, its geography of junctions,
lampposts, trees and, in this fine Swedish autumn, fallen leaves. Across their path lay just such a
drift of dry leaves, which the owner kicked up once. In the previous section we made much of the
use of the path by the walkers in their visual organisation of the walk. In this episode we have a
found feature on this path “today” and the actions for which it provided an occasion. Various
things lying on the path, and in the way, might be analysed by walkers as obstacles to be gotten
around, discarded food the dogs would like (and the owner not) or sticks to be collected for play.
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The drift of leaves, as announced in the owner’s kicking them up, has the possibility to be some-
thing other than just leaves.
At the outset of being among the leaves, the dogs were busy scenting in among them, appar-
ently oblivious to the owner’s attempt to initiate play. It was only when she kicked up some leaves
for the third time that one of the dogs finally saw the offer, jumped, and tried to snap the leaves in
his mouth. Before analysing the leaf kicking and its consequences, we can profitably take a brief
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FIGURE 2 Going off the path—the features of the path. A woman with two
dogs, one black, one gold, walked briskly along the centre of the path in the
park, a short leash for each dog held in each hand (Frame 1). The dogs slowed
and walked off the path beneath a tree where many leaves had fallen. The
owner followed their slight detour and kicked some leaves up (Frames 2 & 3).
There was no response from the dogs to her first kick. Then she kicked for a
second time. On her third kick the black dog ran around a bit, trying to catch
the leaves. The other dog briefly tried to join in and then, instead, returned to
sniffing the ground. From the dogs’ turning around off the path the leashes get
crossed and the owner switched hands before they walked on. She kicked
leaves in various directions, perhaps to direct the movement of the black dog
to avoid crossing leashes again. The owner held the leashes high, close to her
body, moving them almost as reins are used to guide a horse or strings to con-
trol marionettes. They continued walking off the path in the grass and leaves,
the dogs in front and the owner skipping a step to keep up.
detour via the system of turn taking in CA ( Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974). The fact that
talk done predominantly in “turns” has adjacency, means that it can provide for (or not provide
for) relationships between preceding and succeeding turns. One of the devices used incessantly by
speakers in the sequential organisation of conversations is that of adjacency pairs: question–an-
swer, invite–response, greeting–greeting (Sacks, 1992). If the first half of one of these pairs is pro-
duced, it is typically another speaker’s business to provide the second half adjacently. The feature
of interest here is that the meaning of the first action is tied to how it is handled by the second ac-
tion. As such, a “serious” question could be reshaped as a joke by its response or vice versa. More-
over, it is the business of the agent providing the second half of an adjacency pair to show an
understanding of the first action as part of the response. In other words, by responding to an invita-
tion by producing a polite refusal, you are showing that you understood you were being offered an
invitation (and not being insulted, told a story, etc.).
To return to embodied interaction between humans and dogs, we can treat the display and rec-
ognition of actions from human to dog, and back and forth, similarly. What we do not have are
quite the same “turns” of action; yet an action such as kicking leaves can be several things. It could
remain a self-amusement, an ongoing lone activity, or it can be responded to by the other agents as
the initiation of play. By making a playful response, the black dog took it as an opening gambit in a
play episode. In this case the dogs turned and assumed positions facing their owner with their tails
up. By changing their body orientation to face the owner, stopping their locomotion ahead, and
crouching forward slightly, they were displaying understanding of the owner’s kicking of leaves
as an invitation to play together. As it happens, only one dog then started jumping and trying to
catch the leaves while the other continued to snuffle. It is not only owners that can offer potential
starting moves in a play episode. Goode (forthcoming) described the “vulgar availability” of his
dog Katie’s requests to him, and any other willing human, to play “stick” by bringing a stick to
them in her mouth. As Goode’s example and our own observations illustrate, either dogs or hu-
mans can produce invitations to do something else in the midst of another activity. There are, of
course, limitations on what kinds of events invitations between dog and owner can predicate (e.g.,
an invitation to “go for coffee” and what other obligations and expectations go with such an offer).
However, our interest here is not so much in tracing these limits as it is in seeing that an invitation
can be extended and the ways this is accomplished.
Given by the end of the clip that the group had returned to walking across the park, we can be-
gin to access how the brief play episode was brought to a close and walking together resumed.
Having swung ahead of the dogs, the woman, facing backward, pulled first on the lead of the
golden dog at the back (between Frames 4 & 5). This request via the lead got the golden dog un-
derway, and subsequently the black dog joined it in walking as the golden dog passed by the black
dog’s position. The owner also got the group moving by stepping backward and cross-stepping to
turn around to the front while still travelling to the right of the frame (Frame 5). Once again these
were moves that could be understood by the dogs (and the ethnographers) against the backdrop of
their ongoing progress along the park path. The recommencement of the walk happened very
quickly. The dogs did not attempt to seriously hold their ground (unlike in several other of our ob-
servations), and the owner had to run so she could get enough slack to swap the crisscrossing
leashes between her hands (Frame 6).
As shown in Figure 3, while the small dog was sniffing around, the owner was standing, staring
up at the authors filming her from some benches on top of a hill (see Frame 1). Then the woman
pulled the dog onward. The pulling on the lead signaled the dog not only that its owner wanted to
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move on but also that it was being pulled in a particular direction, a direction that was clear in rela-
tion to the uninterrupted path and the unfolding of their walk (as going this way). The pull was
used in sequence with a shake of the lead as a way of communicating further emphasis for the dog
to move along. Note that the tension in a lead is mutually produced—a tug of war with a rope
needs two to perform. A “command,” then, is not transmitted from owner to dog, like a packet of
information. Pace and direction was grounded here in the action of pulling on the leash, and was
felt by both parties in the tension. Off the leash a dog can have a greater distance from its owner, as
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FIGURE 3 Leashed and leashed pass by. An owner was waiting. Behind her,
her small dog was pulling taut its extendible leash while stopping to sniff. After
a long time (at least 20 sec) she looked at the dog, took three steps toward it
(away from their forward direction on the path), and pulled on its leash. The
dog walked on, then snuffled a little longer before being pulled on the leash
once more. Very quickly the dog ran ahead, pulling the leash taut again.
Looking ahead (presumably at the other couple with a dog approaching—out
of the camera view), the owner took the opportunity, when the dog had stopped
to sniff another lamppost, to reel it in. They moved forward close together, the
owner using the leash once more to curb the dog to her side. She switched the
lead from one hand to the other, moving the dog from the inside of the path to
the far side (see sketch), away from the oncoming group, whose dog-member
was also walking very close to them, also on the outside edge of the path rela-
tive to their direction. As they passed, the big dog looked across his owner to
the other dog. After they had passed by, the small dog ran ahead to the full ex-
tension of the lead again. The other dog was patted by one of its fellow walkers
and continued walking close to them.
in the case of the Dalmatian (see earlier discussion). Its problem is that it has at least two things to
watch: first, the one that it always watches (its owner), and second, a passing dog, a passing person
or a squirrel, and so on. The dog on an extendable leash does not have to locate its owner by look-
ing around. The owner is there at the end of the lead. Extending the lead signals the dog through
sound (the whirr of the ratchet) and the sensation that the owner is moving further away from the
dog. As a dog gets to know its lead, the dog can anticipate its limit and run ahead in a way that
slows as the lead reaches its maximum extent. Intuitively we might think of the leash in terms of
what it gives us as owners/walkers: a means of stopping our dog from running away or making the
dog go where we want it to, or making our dog follow us wherever we go. Let us consider instead
for a moment what the lead gives the dog: a proximity to its owner in motion or at rest; a means of
sensing where its owner is—ahead, to the side, or behind—or where its cowalker intends or wants
to go; a way of sensing changes of pace in the walking; and a means of controlling some of its
owner’s movements. Along with the path, the lead is a mutually relevant artefact that binds hu-
mans and dogs together in their cultures of walking.2
Of interest here beyond the mutual use of the lead in walking together is how the lead is in-
volved in passing other walkers, be they groups or lone walkers. In the original video clip, the two
groups passed by one another with no discernible pause or break of stride. This was not accidental,
though it was elegant and economical. When the owners rearranged their group, they took the in-
side track of the path. The dogs were reigned in tight and moved to the outside of the path. The two
units were going to meet one another in a head-on encounter on the path. In anticipating this, the
owners projected ahead that they would bypass one another rather than stop. Given that paths have
the possibility of providing the spatial basis for a meeting and that dogs expectedly will stop and
check one another out by smell as well as by look, each unit had the opportunity to decide whether
would pursue an encounter.
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There are other kinds of human–animal artefacts utilized for the arrangement of walking —a horse’s saddle; cattle
prod; a stick for geese; and leads for pigs, horses, sheep, and many other animals.
3
A quite different approach was taken by Roberts (in press) in which she showed how animal directed utterances are
used in managing conversation between veterinarians and owners.
FIGURE 4 Sketch of passing owner and dog units.
Let us shift to one of the often remarked upon “benefits” of dogs for their owners. Dogs provide
what Sacks (1992) called “tickets” to start conversations between people who are previously un-
acquainted.3 Thus dog walking provides a means for owners to decrease their loneliness and so-
cial isolation through meeting other people while out walking. Under most circumstances city
dwellers do not initiate conversations with people with whom they are unacquainted unless by
way of some legitimate mechanism (Sacks’ ticket) that provides a basis for a conversation. Initi-
ating a conversation with a stranger could be treated as an unwelcome advance, a chat-up line or
begging, and so on. The clip in Figure 3 shows how the use of dogs as tickets for their own-
ers/walkers can be avoided, even if the dogs may well want to check one another out at length.
What is again apparent from this “antisociable” event in humans and dogs walking together is
the asymmetry in the organisation. If we already have the moral expectation that a dog ought to be
accompanied by a competent walker and not the reverse (though we can point out briefly that a
man walking alone in a park is seen as less suspicious if he is accompanied by a dog). What we
saw this time was the shifting of the dog(s) to the outside edge of the groups walking together
when they passed by one another on the same path. There was not, then, a random distribution in
the parts of the walking units. The dogs, if “reigned in,” could be placed to the inside or outside.
The owners shaped the unit in this way so as to pass by another walking unit without pausing, let
alone stopping. We are not saying that this was a law of the park pathway. We are pursuing what
particular social object this arrangement produced in terms of an encounter. Although the dog was
in an asymmetrical position where authority lay with the owners, it was not totally passive in this.
After the successful manoeuvre past the small dog and owner, the large dog was given a pat on the
back as reward. In some sense, this was a gesture to confirm and recognise that the dog did the
right thing. In other words, the pat recognised the dog’s agency, recognised that it was a “good”
dog in an encounter where it had the possibility to do other things (such as lunging at the small
dog, barking, etc.).
UNLEASHED MEETS THE AUTHORS
From the on-the-path camera angle we used for the next video clip (see Figure 5), we could easily
see the owner and dog leashing up long before they were close by on the path (Frame 1). Bringing
her dog into a side-by-side walking position on the leash, the owner kept it walking on the edge of
the path (Frames 2, 3, & 4) while she stayed on the inside track. In this dog-to-outside arrangement,
once again the possibility of encounter was minimised. We could walk around on to the grass to
greet the dog (i.e., her use of the path and position of the dog to avoid meeting other walkers in the
park was defensible). Such an elaborate and odd move on our part could be read as interest in the
dog or, alternatively, as intrusive or threatening. The video clips further reveal that, like two walk-
ers deep in conversation with their heads turned toward each other, the owner and dog were ex-
changing glances with one another. A byproduct of this is that neither the owner nor dog offered a
glance to the oncoming ethnographers (though the dog snuck a quick glance at their backs once
they had passed).
“Rewarding” is a well-known and pervasively used method of dog training and of the organisa-
tion of everyday conduct with them. (We have already noted its occurrence in the previous sec-
tion.) The owner gives food treats and/or spoken praise and/or a clap at the conclusion of an event
where the dog has displayed “good behaviour.” In the example shown in Figure 5, we find some-
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thing of consequence in the timing of the giving of a reward, because the reward was not finally
given until the completion of an extended period of side-by-side walking. The dog, then, had to re-
main focused on walking at the side of its owner. The giving of the treat marked the end of the
side-by-side walking together, as did the removal of the leash. In the rewarding’s spatio-temporal
organisation, the dog had to go to the owner to get its treats, and in a straightforward manner the
owner frequently took this opportunity to bring the dog in close. More subtly, dogs can find that
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FIGURE 5 As we walked along the path with the camera toward the young
woman and her young dog, she bent over the dog to leash it before continu-
ing to walk toward us on the edge of the path. The woman watched the dog
carefully, perhaps because of its youth, and held the leash in two hands, a
grip that gave her more control and made reeling the dog in easiest. The
dog’s head was turned slightly toward her as he walked, and he looked at her
several times. Once past us, the pair stopped, and she gave the dog a treat as
it wagged its tail, after which she took the leash off, and she and the dog ran
across the grass farther into the park.
they are being rewarded for doing something specific. They can locate the action and project
backward from its point of completion. The black dog in this case was not being rewarded con-
stantly during its side-by-side walking. In addition, the visibility of the rewarding allowed the
ethnographers to find what was occurring and why such a reward was given.
In the previous examples (Figures 3 & 4) we noted that during the passing of the two groups the
owners reigned in their dogs and passed quickly without stopping to greet one another. In this case
we have two different kinds of walking-together passing in the park: owner and dog, and three
walkers without dog.
Drawing on a further concept from CA, that of membership categorisation devices (Sacks,
1992a; D. R. Watson, 1993), we find that the park as a setting provides a device for the possible
categorisations of persons (and other living beings, objects, and features).4 So we have as avail-
able linguistic categories most obviously walkers, dog walkers, and pram walkers, and beyond
that, bench sitters, joggers, picnickers, sunbathers, game players, cyclists, feeders of ducks, and so
on. In addition, many parks come with a staff: gardeners, wardens, guides, and so on (Hester &
Francis, 2003). Compared to phone calls (which are organised around the caller and the called),
the park’s categories of occupants have a richness. What we see in parks is structured by the use of
the “consistency” rule such that having selected a park as a basis for categorisation, we can expect
that all the types of occupants we observe should be consistent with what we would ordinarily ex-
pect to find in a park (J. D. R. Lee & Watson, 1993; Sacks, 1992b). When we come upon a dog and
a person walking in the same direction, we see them as an owner walking his or her dog.
The park activities described earlier may be further categorized. Walking in the park generates
categories, and in turn those categories are used in the organisation of walking. Walking in the
park can be done “alone” or as a “together.” “Togethering sets” (Ryave & Schenkein, 1974) in-
clude, most obviously here, a dog connected to a walker by a leash (owner and dog) and also a
woman pushing a pram (mother and child). Hester and Francis (2003) noted that on approaching
individuals while walking, the approacher produces spatial-oriented features such as “to the
right,” “coming toward me,” and so on. In fact, the two cited spatial analyses, which are also those
involved in the clip shown in Figure 5, produce spatial relations that can then be utilised in pass-
ing. A walking unit approaching on the right chooses to pass on the left. What is obvious in the
Figure 5 clip is that the woman and the dog conspicuously displayed on which side of the path they
would be travelling (to the extent that the dog was made to walk off the path).
Having discussed the various organisational and recognitional methods of side-by-side walk-
ing, rewarding, and occasioned classes of human and animal park inhabitants, we wish to examine
the animal categories. There is a relevance for the human component of the walking set as to
whether, for example, two walkers both have the same type of dog and might recognise this
through smiling at one another, doing a greeting, and so on, or both just have a dog and whether
this might be a basis for having something in common. What, though, of the dog? Although it can-
not bring to bear all the resources that people have as language users, we can surely grant dogs
competence in differentiating a walking-together group that includes a dog and one that does not.
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Sacks (1992a) used the example of the doctor’s surgery providing the categories of doctor and patient. D. R. Watson
(1993) used the example of the queue formatting its members as first in line, second in line, and last in line. However, note
that setting should not be equated with place because “doing karate” or “making a phone call” can be a setting that allocates
various categories.
For the Dalmatian in Figure 1 and the black dog in Figure 5, the ethnographers were a human-only
group. In Figure 3, in which the small dog met the bigger dog, the big dog looked across and
checked out the smaller dog. Other categories of groups include groups with children. Dogs are
notorious for spotting joggers and wrongly categorising them as humans requiring chasing and
biting (where a police dog could correctly catch a fleeing suspect). Owners generally have accu-
mulated experience in dealing with various classes of approaching groups in parks that might ex-
cite, frighten, outrage, or disinterest their dog, and they reorganise their arrangement of walking
accordingly.
It is perhaps worth reflecting here on how dogs are instructed in how to deal with various
park-related events. Consider that dogs begin as puppies, jumping up at everyone, straining on
their leash to bark or lick at every passerby. In the clip in Figure 5, we see an owner still perhaps
wary of her young dog. Eventually, if all goes well (which it so often doesn’t), dogs are taught to
ignore other people in the park. But not quite: It is not that they ignore other walkers. They still no-
tice approaching groups (as the dog in Figure 5 did and as did the Dalmatian in the first example).
What they then ought to do is walk past the oncomers without jumping up at them. They are learn-
ing to dwell in the city, to live as city residents that know the appropriate way to walk in the park as
opposed to a farm dog, fighting dog, or foxhound (whose behaviour in a park we cannot predict,
which is part of the problem of a dog out of its culture). The dog has to learn to become an urban
dog that does not bother those that are not its friends (the Dalmatian of Figure 1 being such a dog)
while at the same time its owner must learn what continues to bother the dog. One of the owner’s
problems then is to urbanise his or her dog, and the park is one place for the dog to be in public in
the city and learn how to be an acceptable canine member of the public (because it can be put
down if it gets this wrong by, say, biting a child).
What we believe was coming out in Figure 6 and in the preceding clips is the importance of
body-to-body orientation. The owner could turn her back to her dog, or, in this example, turn her
front to her dog. With a glance the dog would see that the owner was “waiting” if the owner was
showing her front and was immobile. Why didn’t the dog go immediately to the owner if it saw the
owner waiting? A first answer to this question is that “waiting” is our observers’ formulation of
what the owner was doing, not necessarily the dog’s. Essential to the park is a certain freedom for
dogs that they do not have on pavements, or in shops, pubs, buses, and so on. As we argued at the
outset of this article, owner and dog are walking together, and over and over in the cases we
looked at, we saw that dog and owner’s paces and interests in the walk frequently diverged yet
they managed to maintain their walking-together state. Part of this activity inevitably involved
catching up and waiting for one another, and this was something that both walkers did. The owner
did not do anything to hurry the dog such as calling its name. The owner summoned the dog close
when the dog reached the end of the path at its own pace.
At the outset, our argument was that canine mind could be understood through observation of
the mixed species activity in the park, a particular place with spatial features used during a walk.
As a walking-together group (or a walking unit or some other placeholder for this mobile entity),
the owner and dog were still using a path, producing features in the course of their walk, its begin-
ning, its middle, and its end (an end which the owner had arrived at first). To reiterate: The path
provided direction and a succession of sequential properties for the woman-and-dog pair in their
walking together. With a path in use having these directional properties, the barriers ahead be-
came the end of the walk in the park (rather than its entrance point). A host of other features were
constituted: The path’s direction was toward the road rather than away from the road, the way
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home was to the right, the way ahead was downhill, and there was no one between here and the
end of the path. It may not be incidental that the owner arrived first, given that it was her responsi-
bility to leash the dog and perhaps to enforce this as the end of the walk in the park. There were, af-
ter all, ways in which the walk might have continued by reversing back up the path or running off
it into the grass, and these are the kinds of add-ons dogs often try, to the frustration of their human
companion.
It is in these kinds of ways that walking together in the park is brought to an end when those
walking together are not walking side by side (see Figure 7). One of the things that side-by-side
spatial proximity would give a unit is that they would both arrive at the end of the path at the same
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FIGURE 6 Exiting the park. Off the leash, the spaniel was sniffing at a bench and
the leaves alongside the path, as the owner walked ahead. At the edge of the park, the
owner stopped for quite a while, leash in hand. Facing back into the park, she looked
at the dog, which continued to sniff. We were moving along the path with the camera.
The dog looked toward us twice, once while stopped near a lamppost, and again just
on the edge of the park path. When the dog got quite close to the owner and to the edge
of the park, it moved a bit slower. Then the owner used her free hand to pat the side of
her leg as she took several steps toward the dog, reaching out to fasten the leash. They
walked ahead and out of the park side by side.
time and would continue, almost without pause, walking together beside the road. (The Dalmatian
owner in Figure 1 leashed earlier in preparation for ending their “walking in the park.”) To sum-
marise, we have treated the ending of a walk as the lived accomplishment of those walking to-
gether arising out of how they were walking together (i.e., side by side, in close proximity, or at a
distance) with the materials at hand (i.e., leashes, collars, hands, necks, paths, and roads).
WALKING TOGETHER WITH A COMPANION
In analysing dog walking, not only were we committed to treating dogs as competent, skillful,
playful, and often infinitely patient companions (Goode, forthcoming), but we also had a preexist-
ing interest in what could be called the “phenomenology of walking” or “doing walking” as a lived
accomplishment of those who do so. In Ryave and Scheinken’s (1974) study, they showed how
“doing walking” on busy pavements involves production and recognition tasks of walking to-
gether and walking alone. They noted that walking together is a “settinged activity” (p. 269) be-
cause its relevance appears as a function of time, place, and participants. And that setting provides
bases for seeing, noticing, and describing some people as walking together and others as walking
alone. The “normal appearances” of walkers on pavements are tied to the setting, and visual organi-
sation arises through shared methods for analysing and producing those appearances. Seemingly
simple tasks like walking alone or walking with someone else or as a “group” on the pavement are
complicated by other social situations that can be inadvertently (or purposefully) produced on
crowded pavements through pace, distance from other walkers, or direction of route. For example,
following someone, walking side by side, can lead to accusations of rudeness, spying, or pick-
ing-up, and related apologies like, “I’m sorry, it appears that I’m following you but really I’m not.”
Dogs, of course, do not make apologies for misinterpreted following behaviour. They can, how-
ever, like many other animals, disguise their following. Equally, lost dogs are known to walk side
by side with passers by in an attempt to join them. This display of accompanying someone is obvi-
ously observable because such dogs may get restrained and passed on to the authorities or often are
simply shrugged off and told, “Beat it!” Similarly, while out with their owner, dogs will briefly
walk along with other groups before returning to their owner.
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FIGURE 7 Dog leashed at exit.
Using our video data, we aimed in this article to extend and/or shift Ryave and Scheinken’s
(1974) analyses of walking together to walking togethers that involved dogs. The questions we
raised were: (a) How is the togethering set of dog and walker/owner recognised, (b) how is the
togethering set of dog and walker/owner produced, and (c) what are the particular navigational
problems encountered by and as part of a person walking with a dog? Our earlier descriptions be-
gin to provide answers for these questions. The solutions to these problems are then occasions for
showing intelligence or stupidity on the part of a dog, such as when a dog on a lead constantly
walks on the opposite sides of lampposts.
The space that walking produces ahead and behind arranges for walkers a depth of territory
of mutually relevant features. That is, it is a space we are always walking into, out of, passing
by things and moving toward things. In the potentially sociable arena of the park, it is also a
space where groups are approaching, falling behind, walking in parallel, resting nearby, and so
on. Leaves lie across the path ahead. The entrance lies behind. Other walkers are coming to-
ward us, or we are catching up with them. The walker is far from a static observer in front of a
landscape (Wylie, 2003) or an immobilised perceiver in front of an image (Lynch, 1994).
Walking is a joint engagement. In their joint engagement, the participants nevertheless bring
different things to one another’s attention and expect that different things will engage the
other’s attention.
In the clips it was clear that walking is not done unequipped. The lead, the path, the ball or
stick, the reward, are a basic lexicon and/or store of oriented-objects (what Latour might call
“quasi-objects”) or the equipment for this practice. Michael (2000) coined a new compound noun
to encapsulate what we referred to in our analysis as walking units: the hudogledog (hu-
man–doglead–dog). For his actor-network theory inspired work, this mixed-collective noun is im-
portant in recognising the cogency of dog, human, and lead, and the coagency involved in such a
“co(a)gent.” Much in sympathy with our own analysis, Michael is interested in how animals, ob-
jects, humans, and machines are combined as a singularity, or a unit. His reflection arose out of a
situation in which he found himself sitting in the park with his child watching dog walkers in his
local park. For his analysis, as for our own, the dog’s lead in extendable and fixed lengths was im-
portant as a tool for tugging. As we have pursued the importance of leashes, paths, and the orienta-
tion of human bodies to suggest what dogs might have available to them, we must also be wary of
adding all that leash, path, and so on give us as competent users of language. As Sharrock and
Coulter (1998) warned
That a dog can be said to see (what for us as concept-users) is its “bone” in virtue of its discriminant
conduct in respect of that object, does not entail that a dog knows what a bone is: analogical predication
of expressions such as “sees its bone” are derivative from full-fledged, linguistic-level, human predica-
tions. … The determination of what, in a particular situation, some person or animal can correctly be
said to see is a function of how the creature stands in relationship to what the rest of us can say and to the
“social distribution of knowledge” within which we are also situated. (pp. 158–159)
MINDING THE WAY AHEAD
As we noted at the outset, we undertook this article to restore the animal world portrayed by Darwin
and other earlier naturalists as “a place of knowledge, emotion, intention, thinking, and memory”
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(Crist, 1999, p. 202).5 Our move away from privileging the abstract intellect and theory’s problems
is one that is familiar to ethnomethodologists, and philosophers of mind influenced by Ryle (1949)
and Wittgenstein (1953). Such a move often involves rescuing human reason and the grammar of
ordinary language from the elitism of the intellect and the blindness of theory. Too often canine
mind is approached with assumptions that such actions as navigating through space or catching
leaves in a game or even walking itself are outward results of mental/symbolic operations going on
inside the brain of a dog (Goode, forthcoming). An individual consciousness that operates in a mul-
titude of “environments” then becomes a mysterious (and devilishly complicated) meeting of the
environment outside with the sundered consciousness inside. Because, to use a technical term,
cognition stuck inside the skull-bound brain has no distribution, it then requires shared “tools” and
predispositions or evolutionary universals so that it can cope so well (as it does) in so many differ-
ent places. Such terrifyingly complicated theoretical problems begin to dissolve if we situate rea-
soning in the places built by our cultures to exercise it, one of which is, of course, the park.
Our study, though in many ways divergent, can still be profitably allied with approaches from
ANT and others quarters that “rather than assuming separation between humans and animals in
the conferral of rights by the former upon the latter … is an emerging analytic that attempts to see
these as already ‘in relation’ ” (Michael, 2000, p. 137). We can investigate what we attribute to
dogs and expect of them, not just by what we say about them but by what we do with them. We can
formulate from our activities with dogs, as we have done in this article, something of how we live
with them and they with us. If we abandon Cartesian “brains in vats” (Latour, 1999) in favour of
the practical activity and practical reasoning that are done in any particular setting as the work of
the members, be they human or nonhuman, then we need no longer worry about what we will find
inside the head of the dog or inside the head of a human and how communication could possibly
occur between these two isolated brains.
Goode’s respecification of play has provided us with a novel way of bringing forward eth-
no-inquiries and conversational analysis into domains that involve significant yet otherwise ig-
nored life forms in our forms of life. Although Goode rapidly dispensed with “mind” as
irrelevant to his investigation of play, we have retained an interest in using actual episodes to
pursue matters such as where walkers “intend” to go next and how intended actions are pro-
duced and recognised in the lived work of a particular practice. It is the work of Coulter (1983)
and R. Watson (1994) and others (Carlin, 2003; Schegloff, 1992; Silverman, 1998) that has
consistently taken Harvey Sacks, in particular, as a successor to Wittgenstein (1953) in devel-
oping a thorough respecification of mind. Mind has been shifted away from mental, cognitive
terms toward, and replaces in our analyses, the speaker–hearer of talk, with the pro-
ducer–recogniser of intelligible action:
Whereas most discourse analysts concern themselves with the putative “cognitive” competences of
“speakers” and “hearers,” inferring complex mechanisms of disambiguation, inference, interpretation,
and the like, thus courting the “intellectualist legend” against which Ryle warned nearly half a century
ago, CA (at its best) disparages all such talk, being preoccupied with the logical properties of actually
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Crist (1999, 2002) used Fabre on wasps and Darwin on worms to question the “basic assumptions of science and com-
mon sense about what sorts of organisms are capable of intelligence and what are not, and about what sorts of organisms are
able to experience life and what are assumed to be little more than robots” (Crist, 2002, p. 7).
produced utterances, sequences, etc. construed as sui generis properties, i.e., as in significant respects,
analysably “cohort independent.” (Coulter, 1999, p. 178).
On such a basis we have investigated some actual methods, techniques, devices, and myriad
practices involving humans and dogs. It’s obvious that dogs are good walking companions. They
offer this to their owners, and the owners have the obligation to be good walkers with dogs. We
hope it has become apparent how rich and varied are the encounters when humans and dogs walk
together in parks (and other places of canine hospitality and interest).
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